Shermer makes what seems to be a reasonable point, but there are two assumptions behind it: Some moral system is necessary or desirable, and science can be a source of morality.
What if the “scientific” and “rational” ethical system says I’ll cooperate as long as cooperating serves my desires or purposes? What if the ethical system speaks of a large utility, the “greatest good for the greatest number,” as J. S. Mill and others of his ilk would argue? Does that principle support a rational ethics? Certainly, the “greatest good” imposed by a mob to the detriment of individuals has a dubious morality at best. Say that you aren’t a member of the “greatest number.” Wouldn’t your reasoning be different from those that belong to the “greatest number”? Can your individual moral system be a universal moral one, or are you as an individual merely subject under the “greatest good” to a dominant force?
“Okay, so what are you offering in place of an ethics based on reason?” you ask. “Surely, you can see the superiority of reason over belief.”
I guess my first question centers on reason itself. What constitutes rationality when we know such thinking has an underlying unconscious component, possibly even a hormonal one? Can we be confident that in matters of human interaction we manifest pure rationality? Are we free from influences that we can’t enumerate, let alone articulate? If we get to the Golden Rule rationally, do we also arrive at its supporting details in human affairs? And if one argues that “doing as one wants to be done to” is the moral rule, then what do we do with those who want, through their “reasoning” to be undone to. (I know, you’ll say such people are aberrations, that they have psychological or emotional issues that psychologists can identify)
I wish I could trust reasoning as a failsafe mechanism for living ethically, but my experience, if not my reasoning—I think—tells me that I am imperfect. And if I am imperfect, well, I don’t need to point out that all those around me are, in my egalitarian world, just as imperfect. What they consider reasonable can fall under suspicion as a culprit for unethical practices according to my reasoning and experience.
“So, what are you saying? That those who are atheists have flawed ethics, whereas those who have religion have perfect ethics.”
Of course not. I think I know “good” atheists, altruistic atheists, if that counts. Also, we can see many instances of religions gone wild, the eternal spring of wars between opposing versions of a single religion, for example, like Catholics and Protestants or Sunni and Shia. Those historical manifestations of ethical systems at war probably led to the simplistic request of John Lennon in “Imagine” (“nothing to live or die for”). I guess, but I don’t know, the Beatle believed that having no religion would generate a Golden Rule in nonbelievers.
We can’t trust that there is a scientifically-based ethics, can we? I think that is what Shermer and others might argue, maybe one based on sound principles of psychology and social science. But are either of those bodies of knowledge absolute? Or, are they often found to be “best guess” and “appropriate” for the time? Tell me, quickly, what version of psychology lies in your brain? Tell me, quickly, how to understand definitively the Unconscious and its relationship to reason. And tell me that there’s a machine-like objectivity we can follow.
This might seem way off the beaten path toward an ethics, but I think of a YouTube presentation by Dave Killian, an engineer at Snap, Inc. (Snapchat). Killian and his colleagues used cloud computing and storage to handle the flow of data that spiked over New Year’s Eve—when the highest number of people simultaneously use the app. Using DynamoDB as part of AWS and Google Cloud seemed very reasonable, seemed failsafe objective. But as Snap’s cloud servers had to handle Paris, then London, and then New York, the engineers had to do some tweaking. Why? They were learning as Earth turned cities into the New Year. Snap’s engineers decided to go with experiments instead of theory and analysis. They had a so-called objective system that, before they encountered real-time and real-world phenomena, seemed reasonable.
And that might be the problem we all have with any reasoned ethical system. Ultimately, it’s a matter of human adjustment, not a matter of pure reason, which, by the way, those Snap engineers used because of gut feelings about data traffic on New Year’s Eve.
We never know when the “data traffic” of ethics might spike. We might think with Michael Shermer that science and reason will provide a failsafe system superior to religious morality in the absence of a belief in a Higher Being, but in a diverse real world, reason varies from person from person, not because of a failure of logic, but rather because we are more, as humans, than reason—Kant notwithstanding.
I can’t stop thinking about Kant here. Now there’s a guy who did his best to link reason and morality through his “categorical imperative.” It’s a moral principle, a guiding principle. For Kant immorality was irrational. If I understand him correctly, then I see Kant as a proponent of some universal moral principles that underlie all moral systems. One of his tenets seems to be that through reason we can devise maxims that apply universally. Here, I’m thinking as you are, “Can’t Kant see that universal maxims have counter maxims, dueling maxims as they are called?” (Honor your father and mother, but don’t let anyone tell you how to live YOUR life). There’s probably no better example of opposing rationalities than stands on abortion, for example. And, where, I would ask anyone who claims that rational morality is possible, is “pure reason” involved in the argument?
So, controversial as it is, let’s look for a moment at abortion and rationality. Let’s say you believe that abortion is not even a moral issue. It’s a physical issue that speaks to the autonomy of a particular woman, and it is simply an amoral decision. Her independent will is all that matters, proponents would argue. A fetus is just unwanted matter that, if carried to term, brings with it an undesirable change in lifestyle, just as a particular brand of lipstick is unwanted matter and leads, if worn, to a change in physical identity (“Yuk, black lipstick makes you so Goth”). The physical issue also has a moral side, some would argue, one that says an autonomous woman has the right to protect her life as she intends to live it. Then, on the other side of the issue are those who would argue that autonomy of the woman is irrelevant because it violates the autonomy of the independent DNA in the fetus. After all, they would argue, isn’t DNA accepted as a proof of guilt or innocence in the justice system? How can we hold that DNA defines an individual in one instance but not in another. Isn’t that a form of “dueling maxims”?
Michael Shermer writes, “We should[italics mine] continue working on grounding our morals and values on viable secular sources such as reason and science.”* Gotta love it when a proponent of reason throws in a “should.” When’s the last time you accepted all the “shoulds” others advise? How many “universal shoulds” have you encountered and followed? (Other than you should brush your teeth three times a day and floss regularly)
So, in my effort to stir your own thinking, I’ll end with questions for Michael Shermer and Kant. Just what specifically are you recommending as the rational and scientific morality by which humans should live? If reason can be influenced by emotion without an individual’s recognition of the latter’s role in deciding, how viable is it as a secular source of morality? And then, with regard to science as a viable source of morality, how does one deal with a subject like abortion scientifically without considering DNA as an accepted determinant in the Courts? Is there a moral system in nature, you know, Michael, one that can be applied to animals, plants, and, as appears in the same issue of Scientific American, mixotrophs, those seeming combinations of animals and plants?* Or, what happens when our science changes as we stumble on something new? Do we simply change our morality? Everyone knows that we don’t know what we don’t know, so is it possible that what we believe to be “universal” and a “moral should” might not be universal and applicable? And if our science changes, does our moral system change?
*Shermer, Michael. “Silent No More: The Rise of the Atheists.” In his “Skeptic: Viewing the World with a Rational Eye” section of Scientific American, April 2018. Volume 318, No. 4. p. 77.
**Mitra, Adilce, “The Perfect Beast.” Scientific American, April 2018. pp. 28-33.