The smallest and largest of entities and processes operate in ways that are, at best, only slightly fathomable. At best, we guess. That applies to subatomic particles, for example, and also to human interactions. Through most of our lives we act on what seems probable. Often, consequences of our actions are not those we intended.
On the scale of individuals, we see misunderstandings, misinterpreted motives, and malignity where none were intended. Much ado about nothing is a prevailing way of the world. You make an innocent comment. Another takes your word as insult. When you spoke, you operated on the probability of a certain, but different response from your listener’s actual response. So goes, for example, the back-and-forth by political opponents. And the misinterpretations that negate the probable outcomes extend through all aspects of human interactions.
World War I is an example of an outcome different from what seemed probable prior to the fighting. Before the war, the British believed there was a way around conflict—some peaceful solution whose probability seemed great.
In 1920 Viscount Richard Burton Haldane published his account of the pre-war period. He had been Secretary of State for War from 1905 to 1912 and Lord High Chancellor from 1912 to 1915. Haldane’s book, Before the War, was his attempt to define the “thought and action” his country had taken in its efforts first to avert war and second to prepare for it. Those thoughts and actions were driven by what seemed probable.
“With those responsible for the conduct of tremendous affairs probability has to be the guide of life. The question is always not what ought to happen but what is most likely to happen.”*
For eight years prior to the war, Great Britain’s policy toward Germany had been based on the preservation of peace “by removing difficulties and getting rid of misinterpretations” and on making preparations that would provide some security without “provoking, and possibly accelerating, the very calamity against which it was designed to provide.” And here we are, long after not only the First World War, but also after the Second World War and numerous other wars, still operating on the same principle of probability.
Germany obviously misinterpreted. War occurred. And now you operate on the same principle of probability when you address others, particularly those who seem bent on taking some path that might not be in your—or even their—best interests. Must be some kind of human problem, this misinterpreting stuff and this miscalculating of responses.
If our own experiences with others are lessons, then the one that we need to learn is that probable outcomes are not guaranteed outcomes. Oh! Sure. You and I will still operate on that principle of probability, will still look for what we expect. And sure, you and I, like Haldane and the British long before us, will continue to discover that how we think and act will not necessarily result in the outcomes we once thought probable.
* “Chapter 1: Introduction,” Funk & Wagnalls Company, New York and London, 1920. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17998/17998-h/17998-h.htm
On the scale of individuals, we see misunderstandings, misinterpreted motives, and malignity where none were intended. Much ado about nothing is a prevailing way of the world. You make an innocent comment. Another takes your word as insult. When you spoke, you operated on the probability of a certain, but different response from your listener’s actual response. So goes, for example, the back-and-forth by political opponents. And the misinterpretations that negate the probable outcomes extend through all aspects of human interactions.
World War I is an example of an outcome different from what seemed probable prior to the fighting. Before the war, the British believed there was a way around conflict—some peaceful solution whose probability seemed great.
In 1920 Viscount Richard Burton Haldane published his account of the pre-war period. He had been Secretary of State for War from 1905 to 1912 and Lord High Chancellor from 1912 to 1915. Haldane’s book, Before the War, was his attempt to define the “thought and action” his country had taken in its efforts first to avert war and second to prepare for it. Those thoughts and actions were driven by what seemed probable.
“With those responsible for the conduct of tremendous affairs probability has to be the guide of life. The question is always not what ought to happen but what is most likely to happen.”*
For eight years prior to the war, Great Britain’s policy toward Germany had been based on the preservation of peace “by removing difficulties and getting rid of misinterpretations” and on making preparations that would provide some security without “provoking, and possibly accelerating, the very calamity against which it was designed to provide.” And here we are, long after not only the First World War, but also after the Second World War and numerous other wars, still operating on the same principle of probability.
Germany obviously misinterpreted. War occurred. And now you operate on the same principle of probability when you address others, particularly those who seem bent on taking some path that might not be in your—or even their—best interests. Must be some kind of human problem, this misinterpreting stuff and this miscalculating of responses.
If our own experiences with others are lessons, then the one that we need to learn is that probable outcomes are not guaranteed outcomes. Oh! Sure. You and I will still operate on that principle of probability, will still look for what we expect. And sure, you and I, like Haldane and the British long before us, will continue to discover that how we think and act will not necessarily result in the outcomes we once thought probable.
* “Chapter 1: Introduction,” Funk & Wagnalls Company, New York and London, 1920. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17998/17998-h/17998-h.htm
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